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Abstract
Background: This investigation examines differences in cognitive profiles in subjects with major depressive
disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD).
Methods: Data were used from subjects with current MDD (n = 655), GAD (n = 107) and comorbid MDD/GAD (n = 266)
diagnosis from the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). The Composite Interview Diagnostic
Instrument was used to diagnose MDD and GAD. Cognitive profiles were measured using the Leiden Index of
Depression Sensitivity, the Anxiety Sensitivity Index, and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
Results: Results showed that differences in cognitive profiles between single MDD and single GAD subjects were
present: scores on hopelessness/suicidality and rumination were significantly higher in MDD than GAD, whereas anxiety
sensitivity for physical concerns and pathological worry were higher in GAD than MDD. The cognitive profile of
comorbid MDD/GAD showed more extreme depression cognitions compared to single disorders, and a similar anxiety
profile compared to single GAD subjects.
Conclusions: Despite the commonalities in cognitive profiles in MDD and GAD, there are differences suggesting that
MDD and GAD have disorder-specific cognitive profiles. Findings of this investigation give support for models like the
cognitive content-specificity model and the tripartite model and could provide useful handles for treatment focus.
Keywords: Major depressive disorder, Generalized anxiety disorder, Cognitive profiles, Treatment, Classification
Background
Major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety
disorder (GAD) are highly comorbid disorders [1-3].
According to DSM-IV-TR, diagnostic criteria overlap with
regard to symptoms like irritability, trouble with concen-
tration, sleeping problems, restlessness, and fatigue [4].
Research in which the underlying latent structure of com-
mon psychiatric diagnoses was analysed suggested that
GAD belongs to the same dimension as MDD and not to
the anxiety disorder dimension [5,6]. There are indications
that MDD and GAD share the same genetic risk factors
[7,8]. Furthermore, there is overlap in treatment, including
use of antidepressants and psychological interventions.
Despite the commonalities between MDD and GAD
there are also distinguishing factors. Some research,
for instance, gave indications that there are differences
in cognitive profiles [9-12]. A number of models have been
developed to explain these differences. These include the
cognitive content-specificity model [9] and the tripartite
model [10]. The cognitive content-specificity model pos-
tulates that depressed individuals and anxious individuals
differ in their maladaptive thought content. Depressive
thought content reflects themes like negative evaluations
of the self, the world, and the future, [13,14] whereas
anxious thought content reflects only future-oriented
concerns with an anticipation of physical or psychological
threats and an inability to cope [15,16]. In the tripartite
model of anxiety and depression, negative affect is proposed
to be associated with both anxiety and depression, whereas
lack of positive affect is associated with depression and
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physiological hyper-arousal is associated with anxiety
[10,17,18]. In a revised version of the tripartite model
each disorder contains a general, a specific, and a unique
component [19]. The general component refers to a factor
that anxiety and depressive disorders have in common,
the specific component is shared with certain disorders
but not all, and the unique component is a characteristic
of a particular disorder differentiating it from all the
others. Many studies have investigated aspects of the
cognitive content-specificity model and the tripartite
model [11,20-24]. Previous research showed that the con-
structs of the cognitive content-specificity model and the
tripartite model are meaningfully correlated, and that the
integration of the models may better discriminate between
anxiety (high negative affect and anxiety cognitions) and
depression (high negative affect, low positive affect, and de-
pression cognitions) than either model alone [25-27].
So overall there are suggestions for an overlapping
shared latent structure behind GAD and MDD as well
as for distinct underlying cognitive vulnerabilities as
described in e.g. the tripartite and cognitive content-
specificity models. Research on depression and anxiety
cognitions across MDD and GAD shows inconsistent
findings. A meta-analysis of Naragon-Gainey [28] showed
that anxiety cognitions were significantly higher in indi-
viduals with GAD compared to individuals with MDD.
GAD had a strong association with anxiety sensitivity
(tendency to fear anxiety-related sensations) and was related
to physical (fear of physical sensations of anxiety), cognitive
(fear of mental incapacitation or cognitive dyscontrol), and
social concerns (fear of public observation of anxiety). De-
pression was moderately associated with anxiety sensitivity
and was specifically related to cognitive concerns. However,
another meta-analysis, [20] in which the cognitive content-
specificity hypothesis was evaluated, showed that depression
cognitions (mainly measured by the cognitions checklist,
i.e. thoughts of loss and failure) are specific to depressive
symptomatology, anxiety cognitions (mainly measured by
the cognitions checklist, i.e. thoughts of harm and danger)
show no such specificity and are associated with both
depressive and anxious symptomatology in a similar way.
These findings were generally inconsistent with the cogni-
tive content-specificity hypothesis. Also Yook et al. [29]
found no significant differences between MDD and GAD in
anxiety symptoms and pathological worry, which is a major
symptom of GAD (American Psychiatric Association,
1994). Furthermore, Beck et al. (2001) [25] found that
worry is correlated with high negative affect and both are
shared in depression and anxiety. Their results gave also
support that hopelessness is correlated with low positive
affect, and is a unique component of depression.
A better understanding of cognitive profiles in MDD and
GAD is important for making accurate diagnostic deci-
sions, and would indicate whether treatment approaches
developed for MDD might be relevant for GAD and vice
versa. Furthermore, it might highlight effective points
of intervention for comorbid anxiety and depression
symptoms. Little is known about differences and common-
alities in cognitive profiles between comorbid MDD/GAD
(having both a MDD and a GAD diagnosis) and MDD and
GAD, but research indicated that a comorbid MDD/GAD
diagnosis shows more severe cognitive problems than a
single MDD or GAD diagnosis [30].
Consequently, the extent to which underlying cognitive
profiles across GAD and MDD are similar or distinct
remains rather unclear. The present study will examine
differences in cognitive profiles in three cognitive con-
structs: cognitive reactivity to sad mood, anxiety sensi-
tivity and pathological worry. Cognitive reactivity to sad
mood is defined as the extent to which dysfunctional
schemas are activated when mood decreases, [31] and
has mainly been investigated in relation to depression as
compared to anxiety or GAD. Anxiety sensitivity refers to
the fear of anxiety symptoms because of beliefs about their
perceived harmful physical, social, or cognitive conse-
quences, [32] and has been linked to all anxiety disorders
as well as depression [33-36]. Pathological worry is defined
as an unwanted, uncontrollable, aversive cognitive activity
associated with negative thoughts and emotional discom-
fort, [37] and is thought to share the same underlying
cognitive process as rumination [38]. There are indica-
tions that there is no exclusive relationship between
pathological worry and GAD but that pathological worry is
also involved in other anxiety disorders and in depression
[39,40]. However, not many studies have directly compared
MDD and GAD cases in terms of cognitive profiles within
one study, or suffered from small sample sizes or lack of
consideration of comorbidity of GAD and MDD, which is
often present. The present study is set up to do so. We will
compare cognitive profiles in rather large groups of subjects
with MDD and GAD using data of the Netherlands Study
of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). Furthermore, we will
examine to what extent the cognitive profile of subjects
with comorbid MDD/GAD is more comparable to that of
subjects with single MDD or single GAD.
Methods
Study sample
The Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety
(NESDA) is a naturalistic cohort study to examine the
long-term course and consequences of depressive and
anxiety disorders. A detailed description of the design
and sampling is provided elsewhere [41]. In short, 2981
subjects aged 18 through 65 years were included. The
research protocol was approved by the Institutional review
boards of the participating institutes (VU University
Medical Center, University Medical Center Groningen
and Leiden University Medical Center), and all respondents
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provided written informed consent. The sample consists of
subjects with a current or lifetime diagnosis of depression
and/or anxiety, and healthy controls. Recruitment took
place in the general population, in general practices and in
mental health care organisations. Subjects were excluded
when they had a primary diagnosis of psychotic, obsessive
compulsive, bipolar or severe addiction disorder. Baseline
measurements took place between September 2004 and
February 2007 and included an assessment of demographic
and personal characteristics, a standardized diagnostic
psychiatric interview, and a medical assessment.
The Composite Interview Diagnostic Instrument (CIDI
version 2.1) [42] was used to diagnose mental disorders,
including MDD and GAD. For the present study, we
included subjects with 6-month MDD, GAD, and co-
morbid MDD/GAD diagnoses. In total 1028 subjects
were included: 655 with MDD, 107 with GAD and 266
with both MDD and GAD. The mean age of the study
sample was 41.6 years, 66.4% was female, and the mean
of years of attained education was 11.9 years.
Cognitive constructs
The Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS-R), the
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) and the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ) were used to examine cognitive
profiles in MDD and GAD.
The Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS-R)
[43-45] is a self-report measure of cognitive reactivity to
sad mood. The LEIDS-R has 34 items scored on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from “0 = not at all” to “4 = very
strongly” and covers six subscales. Subjects were asked to
indicate whether and how their thinking patterns change
when they experience mild dysphoria. The names of the
subscales and sample items are: Hopelessness/Suicidality
(5 items, for example: ‘When I feel sad, I feel more
hopeless about everything’); Acceptance/Coping (5 items,
for example: ‘When I am sad, I feel more like myself ’);
Aggression (6 items, for example: ‘When I feel down, I
lose my temper more easily’); Control/Perfectionism
(6 items, for example: ‘When I am in a sad mood, I become
more bothered by perfectionism’); Risk Avoidance (6 items,
for example: ‘When I feel down, I take fewer risks’);
Rumination (6 items, for example: ‘When I feel sad, I
spend more time thinking about the possible causes of
my moods’). In several studies the LEIDS-R has been
found to be sensitive to depression history and they
support the validity and the reliability of the LEIDS-R
as a measure of depression vulnerability [43-50]. The
Cronbach’s α for the LEIDS-R subscales was 0.82 for
the subscale Hopelessness/Suicidality, 0.56 for the subscale
Acceptance/Coping, 0.79 for the subscale Aggression,
0.61 for the subscale Control/Perfectionism, 0.67 for the
subscale Risk Avoidance and 0.70 for the subscale Rumin-
ation. Overall, this suggests that the internal reliability of
the subscale Acceptance/Coping is not very good, but that
of all other subscales are acceptable to good.
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) [22] is a 16-item ques-
tionnaire in which subjects indicate on a 5-point Likert
scale (0 = very little to 4 = very much) the degree to which
they fear anxiety symptoms (for example: ‘It scares me
when my heart beats fast’). Although the ASI originally
was postulated to be a unidimensional construct, factor
analyses revealed a multidimensional structure. Previous re-
search on NESDA [12] showed that to maintain good in-
ternal consistency factors were combined to form 2 factors:
a physical concerns factor and a social-cognitive concerns
factor. Items 7 and 13 were left out as both items showed
very low loadings on each of the 2 factors and removal
would improve the internal consistency. The Cronbach’s α
for the physical concerns and social-cognitive concerns was
0.88 and 0.79, respectively.
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) [51] is
originally a 16-item inventory designed to assess patho-
logical worry and to capture the generality, excessiveness
and uncontrollability characteristics of pathological worry
(for example: ‘Once I start worrying, I cannot stop’). Sub-
jects respond using a scale from 1 (not at all typical of me)
to 5 (very typical of me). Factor analyses in previous re-
search showed that a two-factor solution provides a
better fit [52,53]. Factor 1 (Worry Engagement) dem-
onstrated higher internal consistency and significantly
stronger correlations compared to the total PSWQ score
and factor 2 (Absence of Worry). For this investigation,
we used the questionnaire that contained the 11 items
of Worry Engagement. The Cronbach’s α for the PSWQ
scale in the current study was 0.92.
Covariates
Covariates included age, gender, years of education attained,
current (6-month recency) comorbid social phobia and
comorbid panic disorder.
Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were conducted with SPSS Version 20.0
(SPSS Inc, Chicago, Illinois). Chi-square statistics for categor-
ical and analyses of variance for continuous variables were
used to compare characteristics across MDD, GAD and co-
morbid MDD/GAD. Logistic regression analyses determined
whether cognitive vulnerability differed significantly between
MDD and GAD and whether comorbid MDD/GAD differed
from the single disorders. Analyses were corrected for covar-
iates age, gender, years of education attained, current comor-
bid social phobia, and current comorbid panic disorder.
Effect sizes were measured by calculating Cohen’s d [54].
Results
The baseline characteristics of the respondents are sum-
marized in Table 1. The prevalence of comorbid social
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phobia and panic disorder was highest in comorbid
MDD/GAD (46.2% and 42.9%, respectively) and did differ
significantly from MDD.
Table 2 shows the cognitive profiles for subjects with
MDD, GAD, and comorbid MDD/GAD. Hopelessness/
suicidality and rumination were significantly higher in
MDD compared to GAD (p = .004, Cohen’s d = 0.32 and
p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.30, respectively). Physical concerns
were significantly higher in GAD compared to MDD
(p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.32). Pathological worry was sig-
nificantly higher in GAD compared to MDD (p = .01,
Cohen’s d = 0.29). Depression sensitivity and pathological
worry were higher in the comorbid MDD/GAD group
compared to MDD and GAD but physical concerns were
significantly higher in GAD (p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.24).
Logistic regression analysis was used to determine whether
cognitive vulnerability differed significantly between MDD,
GAD, and comorbid MDD/GAD (Tables 3 and 4). A model
was analysed with the subscales of the LEIDS-R, the ASI,
and the PSWQ entered separately (univariable) and entered
simultaneously (multivariable). When MDD and GAD were
compared (Table 3), hopelessness/suicidality and rumination
determined MDD, whereas physical concerns and patho-
logical worry were characteristic for GAD. When cognitive
constructs were entered in a multivariable model, all of these
results remained significant indicating that these cognitive
characteristics were independent of each other.
For MDD versus comorbid MDD/GAD (Table 4)
hopelessness/suicidality, risk aversion, rumination, social-
cognitive concerns, and pathological worry determined
comorbid MDD/GAD. When the items were entered in a
multivariable model, only pathological worry remained
significant indicating higher levels in case of comorbid
MDD/GAD.
When comparing GAD and comorbid MDD/GAD
(Table 4), hopelessness/suicidality, aggression, risk aversion
Table 1 Comparison of baseline characteristics between MDD, GAD and comorbid MDD/GAD
MDD n = 655 GAD n = 107 MDD/GAD n = 266 p*
Sociodemographics
Age (mean yrs, SD) 41.4 (12.3) 42.0 (12.6) 42.2 (11.7) .61
Sex, % female 67.3% 60.7% 66.5% .41
Education (mean yrs, SD) 12.0 (3.2) 11.8 (3.4) 11.6 (3.4) .41
Comorbidity
Social phobia 28.2% 37.4% 46.2% <.001b
Panic disorder 31.3% 33.6% 42.9% .004 b
Note. MDD =major depressive disorder, GAD = generalized anxiety disorder, MDD/GAD = comorbid major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.
*p-value based on chi-square statistics for categorical variables and analyses of variances for continuous variables (p < .05).
bMDD vs MDD/GAD.
Table 2 Psychological cognitions of MDD, GAD and comorbid MDD/GAD*
MDD n = 655 GAD n = 107 MDD/GAD n = 266 p**
Depression sensitivity (LEIDS-R)
Hopelessness/suicidality 7.2 (4.8) 5.7 (4.5) 8.6 (5.3) <.001a,b,c
Acceptance/coping 1.8 (2.3) 1.7 (2.1) 2.1 (2.4) .26
Aggression 6.1 (4.8) 5.4 (4.2) 7.1 (4.8) .01c
Control/perfectionism 6.5 (3.9) 6.5 (3.9) 7.3 (3.9) .10b
Risk aversion 10.7 (4.3) 10.3 (4.4) 12.0 (4.6) .004b,c
Rumination 11.7 (4.4) 10.3 (4.8) 13.3 (4.5) <.001a,b,c
Anxiety sensitivity (ASI)
Physical concerns 7.7 (6.5) 10.7 (7.3) 9.1 (6.1) <.001a,c
Social-cognitive concerns 7.8 (4.5) 8.1 (4.3) 9.5 (4.7) .01b,c
Worry (PSWQ) 36.5 (9.9) 39.2 (8.6) 42.6 (8.5) <.001a,b,c
Note. MDD =major depressive disorder, GAD = generalized anxiety disorder, MDD/GAD = comorbid major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.
*analyses corrected for covariates age, sex, education, comorbid social phobia and comorbid panic disorder.
**p-value based on analyses of variances (p < .05).
aMDD vs GAD.
bMDD vs MDD/GAD.
cGAD vs MDD/GAD.
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and rumination, and social-cognitive concerns were
characteristics of comorbid MDD/GAD, whereas higher
physical concerns determined GAD. When a multivari-
able model was analysed, higher scores of hopelessness/
suicidality, rumination, and social-cognitive concerns
determined comorbid MDD/GAD, whereas higher physical
concerns determined GAD.
Discussion
The aim of this investigation was to examine cognitive
profiles in MDD and GAD, and to examine whether
cognitive profiles differentiate between these disorders.
Furthermore, we wanted to investigate if the cognitive
profile of comorbid MDD/GAD is more comparable
with MDD or with GAD. The results showed that there
are differences in depression and anxiety cognitions in
MDD and GAD, although differences showed moderate
effect sizes. Furthermore, most subscales showed similar
results for MDD and GAD. Previous research is inconsist-
ent about these findings. For example, in a meta-analysis
Beck & Perkins [20] showed that depression cognitions
are relative unique to depression but anxiety cognitions
were shared in depression and anxiety, which is in con-
trast with our findings. Differences can be explained by
the use of different cognitive constructs (for example the
Cognitions Checklist that was not included in NESDA),
different sample sizes, and the fact that investigations did
not always take place in clinical settings. Other research,
however, demonstrated that MDD and GAD indeed have
disorder-specific cognitive profiles [11]. Despite the
commonalities in cognitive profiles in MDD and GAD,
we also found differences that seem to be characteristic for
the disorders. We found that hopelessness/suicidality and
rumination are more common in MDD whereas physical
concerns and pathological worry are more common in
GAD. Our findings are in line with previous research,
[13,21,25,28,29] and seem to fit in models like the cog-
nitive content-specificity model and the tripartite model
of anxiety and depression.
Table 3 Uni- and multivariable associations between
cognitive profiles and single MDD (reference) versus
single GAD*
MDD versus GAD subscales
Univariable Multivariable
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Depression sensitivity (LEIDS-R)**
Hopelessness/suicidality 1.54 (1.21-1.97)‡ 1.47 (1.05-2.04)‡
Acceptance/coping 1.10 (0.88-1.36) 1.08 (0.85-1.37)
Aggression 1.25 (1.00-1.57)† 1.02 (0.77-1.36)
Control/perfectionism 1.04 (0.84-1.28) 0.86 (0.66-1.13)
Risk aversion 1.18 (0.95-1.46) 0.94 (0.69-1.28)
Rumination 1.49 (1.20-1.85)‡ 1.78 (1.28-2.46)‡
Anxiety sensitivity (ASI)**
Physical concerns 0.47 (0.33-0.67)‡ 0.42 (0.28-0.65)‡
Social-cognitive concerns 1.02 (0.66-1.57) 1.31 (0.73-2.36)
Pathological worry (PSWQ)** 0.73 (0.55-0.95)‡ 0.52 (0.37-0.74)‡
Note. MDD =major depressive disorder, GAD = generalized anxiety disorder.
*based on logistic regression analyses corrected for covariates age, sex,
education, comorbid social phobia and comorbid panic disorder.
**all items analysed per SD increase.
†p < .10; ‡p < .05.
Table 4 Uni- and multivariable associations between cognitive profiles and single MDD (reference) versus comorbid
MDD/GAD, and single GAD (reference) versus comorbid MDD/GAD*
MDD versus MDD/GAD subscales GAD versus MDD/GAD subscales
Univariable Multivariable Univariable Multivariable
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Depression sensitivity (LEIDS-R)**
Hopelessness/suicidality 0.83 (0.72-0.95)‡ 1.03 (0.86-1.25) 0.57 (0.44-0.73)‡ 0.70 (0.50-0.97)‡
Acceptance/coping 0.92 (0.80-1.05) 0.95 (0.82-1.11) 0.84 (0.66-1.07) 0.75 (0.55-1.03)†
Aggression 0.88 (0.76-1.01)† 1.03 (0.87-1.22) 0.67 (0.51-0.87)‡ 0.91 (0.66-1.25)
Control/perfectionism 0.87 (0.75-1.00)† 1.03 (0.85-1.23) 0.83 (0.66-1.05) 1.21 (0.88-1.66)
Risk aversion 0.82 (0.71-0.95)‡ 1.05 (0.86-1.29) 0.72 (0.58-0.91)‡ 1.24 (0.89-1.73)
Rumination 0.75 (0.64-0.87)‡ 0.93 (0.75-1.17) 0.52 (0.41-0.67)‡ 0.57 (0.40-0.82)‡
Anxiety sensitivity (ASI)**
Physical concerns 0.83 (0.64-1.10) 1.19 (0.86-1.64) 1.92 (1.26-2.94)‡ 4.03 (2.24-7.24)‡
Social-cognitive concerns 0.63 (0.47-0.85)‡ 0.91 (0.62-1.33) 0.59 (0.36-0.96)‡ 0.47 (0.23-0.95)‡
Pathological worry (PSWQ)** 0.46 (0.37-0.56)‡ 0.45 (0.35-0.57)‡ 0.61 (0.44-0.84)‡ 0.88 (0.59-1.31)
Note. MDD =major depressive disorder, GAD = generalized anxiety disorder, MDD/GAD = comorbid major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.
*based on logistic regression analyses corrected for covariates age, sex, education, comorbid social phobia and comorbid panic disorder.
**all items analysed per SD increase.
†p < .10; ‡p < .05.
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Our results showed that rumination is more prominent
in MDD whereas worry is more prominent in GAD.
Although our findings are much in line with previous
studies, [55-57] the assertion that worry only relates to anx-
iety and rumination only to depression has been challenged.
Worry has been found to be associated with depression,
and rumination with anxiety [37,58-60]. There is a general
consensus that rumination and worry share some degree of
overlap. However some researchers argue how similar
rumination and worry are. Rumination has been found
significantly correlated to worry [60,61]. Furthermore,
Segerstrom et al. (2000) [61] found that both rumination
and worry are forms of repetitive thinking. Watkins et al.
(2005) [62] examined differences and similarities between
rumination and worry and found very few differences.
One difference in their study was the temporal content of
the intrusive thoughts. Worry thoughts were more con-
cerned with the future and less concerned with the past
than ruminative thoughts which was in line with previous
research [56]. So it seems that rumination is oriented
towards the past and is more strongly associated with
depression, while worry is oriented towards the future
and is more strongly associated with GAD.
We found higher scores on hopelessness/suicidality in
MDD compared to GAD. Previous research reported
that hopelessness is a stronger indicator of depression than
anxiety, and may distinguish individuals with MDD from
those with GAD [15,21,25]. Some recent studies point at
the role of intolerance of uncertainty, [21,29,63-65] which
can be defined as a cognitive bias that affects how a person
perceives, interprets, and responds to uncertain situations
on a cognitive emotional and behavioural level [66]. It
has been suggested that intolerance of uncertainty is of
influence on the different paths leading to MDD or
GAD. The point at which individuals become certain
about both the absence of a positive future and the
presence of a negative future leads to hopelessness about
the future, and this leads to increased symptoms of depres-
sion (e.g. suicidality) [21,67,68]. However, Sargalska et al.
(2011) showed that only certainty about the absence of a
positive future (and not the presence of a negative future)
predicts suicidal ideation, even after adjusting for hopeless-
ness and symptoms of depression [69].
Another finding in our study was that physical concerns
are more prominent in GAD compared to MDD, but
cognitive and social concerns do not differ between
GAD and MDD. Anxiety sensitivity refers to the fear of
anxiety symptoms because of beliefs about their perceived
harmful physical, social, or cognitive consequences [32].
Most of earlier research focused on the relation between
anxiety sensitivity and panic disorder, and since the early
1990s research has expanded to include other internalizing
disorders. There is some evidence suggesting that the
anxiety sensitivity dimensions correspond to specific
anxiety disorders. Physical concerns are more strongly
associated with panic disorder, social concerns are more
strongly associated with social phobia, and cognitive con-
cerns are more strongly associated with GAD [33-35,70].
Previous research indicated that anxiety sensitivity is not
only associated with anxiety but also with depression,
[33,35,36] raising the question whether anxiety sensitivity
is specific for anxiety disorders or for distress in general.
In a meta-analysis, Olantunji and Wolitzky-Taylor (2009)
[71] showed that individuals with anxiety disorders re-
ported greater overall anxiety sensitivity than those
with mood disorders. However, significant effect sizes
were only found for panic disorder. It has been argued
that physical and social concerns are more specific for
anxiety, whereas cognitive concerns are more specific
for depression [35]. Another meta-analysis [28] showed
that GAD had a strong association with anxiety sensi-
tivity and is related to physical, cognitive, and social
concerns, whereas depression was moderately associ-
ated with anxiety sensitivity and is specifically related
to cognitive concerns. Relating to our results, there
seems to be overlap in cognitive and social concerns in
MDD and GAD but the physical component seems to
be more specific for anxiety.
The cognitive profile of comorbid MDD/GAD showed
more extreme depression cognitions than both single
disorders, and a comparable anxiety profile compared
to GAD. These results may suggest that comorbidity
between MDD and GAD denotes a more severe illness
since previous research showed that severity is strongly
related to comorbidity [2]. As mentioned before, depression
and anxiety have notably high rates of comorbidity.
Cognitive constructs may shed some light on the issue
of comorbidity but also other factors seem important. For
example, previous research showed a systematic link be-
tween personality traits and psychopathology [72]. Possibly,
personality traits may serve as vulnerability factors or may
be the underlying cause of a disorder. For instance, neuroti-
cism/negative emotionality (stress reactivity and a tendency
to experience negative emotions) has shown to be elevated
in both depressive and anxiety disorders and consequently
could contribute to comorbidity among them [73].
This study has several strengths. The large sample size,
including well diagnosed subjects with affective and anx-
iety disorders allows in-depth analyses of the cognitive
profiles of subjects with MDD and GAD. Subjects were
recruited in both primary care and specialized mental
health care increasing the generalizability of our findings
to standard clinical settings.
Limitations of this study should be acknowledged as
well. First, the cross-sectional study design precludes any
causal interpretations regarding the cognitive profiles in
MDD and GAD, and longitudinal studies are necessary
to address such questions. Second, GAD was not the
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only anxiety disorder present and we did not exclude sub-
jects with other anxiety disorders. However, analyses were
corrected for comorbid panic disorder and social phobia
and comorbidity patterns were not different across single
MDD and single GAD groups. Subjects were excluded
when they had a clinically primary diagnosis of severe
other psychiatric disorders such as psychotic, obsessive
compulsive, bipolar or severe addiction disorder. However,
some other conditions may have been present which were
not further assessed, such as posttraumatic stress disorder,
specific phobia, personality disorder or eating disorder.
Consequently, we could not examine the full range of co-
morbidity among GAD and MDD in more detail. Third,
the group sizes differed substantially: the GAD group was
smaller compared to the MDD group, which indicates that
statistical significance was harder to obtain for the single
GAD group comparisons. However, when examining the
results of the study, this does not seem to have affected
the conclusions of the paper. Finally, a selection has been
made among the available measurements of depression
and anxiety cognitions. It would have been interesting to
include intolerance of uncertainty, which is discussed
broadly because of the possible high influence on the
different paths leading to MDD and GAD [21,29].
Conclusion
The classification of MDD and GAD was under scrutiny
in the process leading to DSM-5 and there has been a
number of calls to reclassify GAD in the same category
as MDD (‘the distress disorders’). Early GAD definitions
suffered considerably from low reliability and poor valid-
ity. However, worry became the essential feature of GAD
in DSM-III-R [74]. DSM-IV further clarified the diagnosis
by focusing on physical symptoms around chronic levels
of tension and removing symptoms that more likely reflect
acute autonomic arousal. These changes increased the
diagnostic reliability and helped to distinguish GAD from
other anxiety and mood disorders and demonstrated
unique mechanisms and patterns of impairment. This
is an important reason why MDD and GAD are still repre-
sented as distinct disorders in DSM-5.
The results of this study demonstrate that subjects with
MDD and GAD have disorder-specific cognitive profiles,
despite commonalities in other aspects. Specific depression
cognitions, such as rumination, hopelessness, and suicidal-
ity, are more prominent in MDD whereas specific anxiety
cognitions, such as physical concerns and pathological
worry, are more prominent in GAD. These findings suggest
that both MDD and GAD have specific features and
may support a separate classification of MDD and GAD.
Furthermore, the cognitive profile of comorbid MDD/
GAD showed more extreme depression cognitions than
both single disorders, and a comparable anxiety profile
compared to GAD. The findings of this investigation give
support for models like the cognitive content-specificity
model and the tripartite model and could provide useful
handles for treatment focus.
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